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Abstract  
 
 
This paper provides a new approach to assess the impact of organisational 
changes fostering employee involvement, performance related pay schemes and 
other relevant trends in personnel policy on the gender wage gap. Our 
results indicate that innovative human resource practices tend to limit the 
wage differential between men and women. The innovation of this study is 
that we use linked employer-employee data to look at within-firm gender 
wage differentials. To investigate the theoretical hypotheses regarding the 
effect of selected human resource measures on gender wage inequality, we 
calculate a firm-specific gender wage gap accounting for differences in 
individual characteristics.  
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Non-technical summary 
According to the theory of discrimination (Becker 1957), firms must forego profits in order 
to dwell on the taste for discrimination of customers, employees or executives. Hence, 
disparate remuneration of men and women is not for free. Given the increasing competitive 
pressure caused by globalisation and the adoption of technological innovations, shareholders 
more and more push for the reorganization of work processes. The question we hence want 
to answer is whether women benefit from innovative human resource policy or not. 
The fundamental innovation of this research is that we provide a new approach to assess the 
impact of organisational changes fostering employee involvement, performance related pay 
schemes and other relevant trends in personnel policy on the gender wage gap (GWG). In 
contrast to the existing literature, we base our analysis on within-firm gender wage 
differentials. To investigate the theoretical hypotheses regarding the effect of selected human 
resource measures on wage inequality, we calculate a firm-specific GWG under the 
assumption that male and female employees had the same characteristics within each firm. 
Using this measure of an “unexplained” wage differential as dependent variable in the 
second step, we can determine the impact of selected firm characteristics and personnel 
policy measures on the wage inequality within firms using regression analyses. The 
empirical analysis is based on the German LIAB data, a representative linked employer-
employee panel.  
Consistent with the theoretical arguments, our empirical results indicate that organizational 
changes fostering the participation of employees limit the wage differences between men and 
women within the same establishments. Our results further indicate that continuous training 
programs reduce the within-firm GWG. Both the share of training participants in all 
employees as well as the female share among training participants further reduces the wage 
difference between men and women. We hence conclude that training helps to balance 
existing gender differences in job-related human capital. Also equal opportunity programs 
tend to reduce the pay differential, albeit the effect is not statistically significant. 
Performance depending pay systems do not involve lower gender wage gaps within firms. 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the crowding out of voluntary co-operation 
and intrinsic motivation by performance related pay systems is more relevant for women. 
Furthermore, the share of women affected by extensive performance pay schemes is rather 
small. Finally, performance related bonuses may in practice relate to the base salary. As a 
consequence, the incentive pay system manifests the original pay gap. 
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1. Introduction 
Unequal treatment of men and women in the labor market is a very persistent abuse. Despite 
the shrinking difference between men and women with respect to occupational skills, 
experience and labor market attachment, women still tend to earn lower wages than men. 
Traditionally, the wage differences between men and women are assigned to either 
differences in individual characteristics or differences in remuneration. The „unexplained” 
part of the measured gender wage gap (GWG) is often interpreted as discrimination and 
taken for granted. Recently, however, politics and umbrella organizations of the industry in 
several countries came up with new anti-discrimination laws and agreements to foster equal 
opportunities for women and men.   
According to the theory of discrimination (Becker 1957), firms must forego profits in order 
to dwell on the taste for discrimination of customers, employees or executives. Hence, 
disparate remuneration of men and women is not for free. Taking into account that the 
interests of managers and executives do not perfectly accord with the proprietor’s goals, they 
may still use any opportunity to follow their taste of discrimination. Given the increasing 
competitive pressure caused by globalisation and the adoption of technological innovations, 
especially in terms of information and communication technology, shareholders more and 
more push for the reorganization of work processes. If the adoption of innovative workplace 
practices actually helps to gain structural competitive advantages by increasing the 
efficiency of the organization (see e. g. Becker and Gerhart 1996; Huselid, Jackson and 
Schuler 1997; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997; Appelbaum et al. 2000), it is par for 
the course that the innovations in the workplace organization also help to limit the inherent 
and costly taste for discrimination and hence reduce the GWG within establishments. The 
question we hence want to answer in this paper is whether women benefit from innovative 
human resource policy or not. 
To illustrate the importance of the organizational structure for the wage setting process, just 
recall that individuals deciding on wage rates are part of an organization embodying a 
specific philosophy and defining rather strict rules and norms of collaboration. Managing a 
firm always requires an overall concept of how processes should work, how people should 
interact among each other and within the courses of action and how performance should be 
rewarded. Looking closely at the design of work and decision processes, pay systems, 
internal qualification activities and firm philosophy often reveals the firm’s image of male 
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and female employees and its attitude towards gender equality. In this study, we will 
therefore focus on whether the gender pay differential is affected by selected human resource 
practices and specific features of firm policy, primarily their attitude towards gender 
equality. Apart from Drolet (2002) as well as Datta Gupta and Eriksson (2006), we are not 
aware of any other study looking at the effect of new workplace practices on the distribution 
of male and female wages. While Drolet (2002) finds evidence that participation in self- 
directed work groups and performance-based pay help to explain wage differences between 
men and women, Datta Gupta and Eriksson (2006) are rather sceptical about the 
discrimination-reducing effect of new workplace practices.  
Although changes in the work organisation during the last decades are diverse and difficult 
to summarize by a few key concepts, there has emerged an agreement that employee 
involvement and monetary incentive systems represent the most pervasive changes in 
modern personnel management (Delery and Doty 1996; Appelbaum et al. 2000; Godard 
2004). Even if the percentage of workplaces reporting selected management initiatives are 
somewhat higher in other European countries – especially in Sweden and the United 
Kingdom – flattening management structures, using team-based work organization, 
involving lower level employees or performance-related pay systems are no more rare events 
in German establishments (OECD 1999). While the impact of increasing employee 
involvement and financial incentives on firm performance is widely analyzed (Becker and 
Gerhart 1996; Huselid, Jackson and Schuler 1997; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997; 
Appelbaum et al. 2000; Godard and Delany 2000; Wolf and Zwick 2002; Black and Lynch 
2001 and 2004), the empirical evidence on the specific benefit for male and female wages is 
rather limited. Considering the importance of these organizational changes, we will extend 
the existing literature by assessing the effect on the firm-specific GWG in Germany.  
The reorganisation of work – away from a task-specialized structure towards a more task-
integrated organizational structure – often evokes the need for additional vocational training 
(Black and Lynch 1998). Apart from that, the exigency for continuous training permanently 
increases due to the fast and ongoing technological change. Continuous training allows the 
employees to adapt to the new requirements resulting from organisational and technological 
changes and hence to maintain their productivity. Note, however, that men and women suffer 
and benefit in different ways from these occurrences. At first, the unremitting depreciation of 
human capital accumulated during initial training diminishes primary differences in human 
capital endowment between male and female employees. This process in fact holds a chance 
for women to catch up. Whether women may actually get the opportunity to adapt to the 
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technological and organisational changes and catch up with their male colleagues hence 
depends crucially upon the training program of their employer. Our aim in this paper is to 
investigate whether in-plant training programs and the share of female participation have a 
positive effect on the within-firm GWG or whether continuous training is less accessible to 
women and consequently increases gender inequality.  
Finally, we state an increasing social and political alertness for the disadvantages of women 
in the labor market. In Germany, for instance, the government and the central associations of 
the German industry agreed on a convention to foster equal opportunities of women and men 
in the private sector („Vereinbarung zur Förderung der Chancengleichheit von Frauen und 
Männern in der Privatwirtschaft“) in July 2001. This voluntary commitment includes 
personnel measures to force the professional opportunities of women and facilitate the 
reconciliation of family and work for mothers and fathers. The offers range from flexible 
working hours, seminars for employees who are in maternity leave to child care facilities and 
information centres. Also studies from other countries lead one to suppose that measures to 
balance work and life become more and more popular (see e.g. Evans 2001 and 2002, OECD 
2003 or Fernie and Gray 2002). In the following study, we will investigate whether the 
corporate accord on fostering equal opportunities of women and men in the private sector 
also results in lower wage differentials between men and women.  
The fundamental innovation of this research is that we provide a new approach to assess the 
impact of organisational changes fostering employee involvement, performance related pay 
schemes and other relevant trends in personnel policy on the GWG. In contrast to the 
existing literature, we base our analysis on within-firm gender wage differentials. 
International evidence shows that women concentrate in low paying jobs, firms and 
industries (OECD 2002, Dolado et al. 2001, Bayard et al. 2003). Our descriptive figures also 
illustrate that the mean cross-section GWG within firms is somewhat smaller than the mean 
overall GWG, which hints at a selection of women into low-paying firms. Using the within-
firm GWG as an explanatory variable, our analysis describes the effect of innovative human 
resource practices on the GWG, taken the selection into firms – a process which is very 
difficult to explain without special survey data on job seeking and selection procedures of 
firms – as given. Accepting that the distribution of women among firms is not random, the 
analysis of intra-firm wage differences may reveal new insights into the nature and sources 
of pay differentials between male and female colleges.  
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To investigate the theoretical hypotheses regarding the effect of selected human resource 
measures on wage inequality, we calculate a firm-specific GWG under the assumption that 
male and female employees had the same characteristics within each firm. Using this 
measure as dependent variable in the second step, we can determine the impact of selected 
firm characteristics and personnel policy measures on the wage inequality within firms using 
regression analyses. The empirical analysis is based on the German LIAB data, a 
representative linked employer-employee panel including information on all employees of 
firms covered by the IAB establishment survey. The LIAB merges annual survey data (the 
IAB-establishment panel) and process generated individual data (the Employment Statistical 
Register of the IAB, which is based on administrative social security records). Given the rich 
information on the establishments in our survey, we can control for many firm-specific 
attributes and features, such as size, wage level, female share or qualification level of the 
staff as well as the institutional setting, that is, the existence of works councils or collective 
agreements.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss some 
theoretical considerations regarding the diverse channels through which the GWG may be 
affected by human resource practices and selected firm-specific characteristics. After a 
description of the design and source of the data in use, we discuss our empirical approach. 
Section 5 provides a rough picture of our sample and the use of innovative workplace 
organizations. The estimation results are presented in Section 6. The last section concludes. 
2. How do innovative organizational structures affect male and 
female wages? 
Researchers have stressed that firms have to adjust their organizational structure to adapt to 
changing requirements of the product markets and maximize the benefits of technological 
innovations, such as the use of computers. In short, firms put more emphasis on teams and 
skills (Bresnahan, Brynjolffson and Hitt 2002, Ichniowski and Shaw 2003 and Caroli and 
Van Reenen 2001). Accepting that the adoption of innovative human resource measures as 
well as training have an impact on productivity (see e.g. Huselid 1995, Ichniowski, Shaw 
and Prennushi 1997, Appelbaum et al. 2000, Godard and Delany 2000 or Lazear 2000, 
Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen 2006), it is easily comprehensible that also the wage level 
corresponds to this firm policy (see e.g. Bauer and Bender 2001, Cappelli 2000 or Hunter 
and Lafkas 2003, Osterman 2006). Most studies ignore, however, that the effects on 
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productivity and/or wages may differ by individuals, for example, by men and women. 
Although there is no comprehensive theory formalizing the effects of employee involvement 
and performance pay on the GWG, there exist various links between personnel and 
organizational policy and the wage structure within establishments. In the following, we will 
hence expound the interaction between employee involvement, performance related pay 
systems, continuous training and corporate agreements to foster equal opportunities of 
women and men in more detail.  
The main principle behind all initiatives to increase the involvement of workers is to get the 
lower level staff more involved in the decision making and work process and to grant these 
employees greater autonomy and control over job tasks and methods of work (Cappelli and 
Rogovsky 1994). Typical measures to achieve that goal are teamwork, lean management, or 
reduced hierarchic levels (Godard 2004). But how may increased employee involvement 
affect the wage differentials between men and women? First of all, decentralization gives 
women a formalized opportunity to play an active part in decision-making and helps to 
reveal their competences. Given that the need for recognition is generally more pronounced 
among men, this institutional speaking tube may be very beneficial for women who are 
intimidated by dominant male colleagues. Second, team work fosters the interaction and 
cooperation between employees. Thanks to the intense exchange of skills and information 
within teams, female employees can better appraise their own contribution to the output of 
the team and contrast their personal value added with their own and their colleagues’ wage 
rates. It may be argued, however, that female members within teams often perform better 
than their male colleagues, but their remuneration is restricted by the average team 
performance. Admittedly, teams would prevent positive wage premiums for women in this 
setting, but they also avoid negative wage cuts. As a result, team work is likely to limit the 
potential of continuously unequal treatment of men and women.  
Third, the reorganization of work towards “holistic” organization generally goes along with 
task enrichment, versatile work and learning across tasks, that is the use of experience gained 
at one task to enhance performance at another task (Lindbeck and Snower 2000). Empirical 
evidence also suggests that the use of innovative workplace practices increases the 
importance of interpersonal interaction in the job (Borghans, ter Weel and Weinberg 2005). 
According to experimental studies of psychologists, women are more versed in multitasking, 
communication and team playing (see e.g. Rubinstein, Meyer and Evans 2001) and hence 
may benefit from this task enrichment and the increased emphasis on interactive skills. In 
contrast to these positive effects on the position of women within their firms, there exists 
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some evidence that teamwork and flatter hierarchies generally increase inequality among the 
colleagues, because it is mainly the upper part of the income distribution who benefits from 
these work practices (see e.g. Bauer and Bender 2001). Thanks to our data, we can identify 
establishments having introduced different measures fostering employee involvement. 
Owing to these organizational changes, traditional Fordist control measures are put into 
question or rendered more costly, because individual effort cannot be measured easily any 
more (Kruse 1993; Holmstrom and Milgrom 1994; Milgrom and Roberts 1995). Hence, the 
establishment of flatter organisational structures and the adoption of other work practices 
fostering employee involvement are usually accompanied by a shift to performance-based 
pay schemes. Provided that women’s wages suffer from discrimination, that is, the GWG 
does not represent real differences in productivity, they should benefit from performance 
related pay systems. According to Baker et al. (1988) one can distinguish between objective 
and subjective performance measures. While objective measures, such as sales or profits, 
rely on quantifiable performance criteria and therefore prevent disparate remuneration of 
men and women1, subjective measures generally rely on the evaluation by supervisors and 
hence still provide some scope for discrimination. Compared to fixed wage rates – bargained 
secretly between employee and management – incentive pay systems based on the evaluation 
of the supervisor may still limit discretion due to the increased transparency, bureaucratic 
rules in compensation decisions and the need of vindication by the supervisor (see e.g. 
Prendergast and Topel 1996). Jirjahn and Stephan (2004) show, for instance, that the GWG 
among German blue-collar workers is substantially lower if wages rely on piece-rates than in 
the time-wage regime. 
Even if objective measures seem to be more traceable by employees, Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1991) argue that all kinds of measurable performance indicators upon which 
rewards are based may aggregate highly disparate aspects of performance into one single 
number, but may always omit other important aspects of performance that are essential to 
achieve the firm’s goal. Given this incomplete set of performance measures and the 
ignorance on how agents respond to these incentives, the motivating effect of these incentive 
schemes are rather questionable. To circumvent this problem, firms may rather use 
                                                          
1 The degree to which performance-related pay systems decrease the gender-specific wage rate depends upon the 
correlation between the relevant performance indicators and actual productivity. If, for instance, the wage rate is 
linked to parameters that are subject to factors employees can not control, such as changes in global demand or 
institutional changes, the gap between productivity and wage rate does not necessarily shrink and hence the 
GWG does not decrease either.  Dressler (1999) as well as Kaschube and Rosenstiel (2000) even show that 
performance-related pay systems whose basis for assessment is only loosely linked with individual performance 
evoke little effect on motivation and future performance. 
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subjective performance measures or implement other instruments to control their agent’s 
performance (e.g. job design, competing activities). Another issue might be that material 
incentives may crowd out voluntary co-operation and intrinsic motivation (see e.g. 
Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996; Deci et al., 1999, Frey and Jegen, 2000 or Fehr and 
Gächter, 2001). If this discouraging effect is larger for women than for men, the equalizing 
effect of performance related pay system is foiled. To evaluate the impact of performance 
related pay schemes on the within wage gap, we can revert to the comprehensive information 
on shared-ownership and profit sharing in our data. 
Despite the increasing equalization of educational degrees among men and women in 
Germany, human capital in terms of works experience does still differ significantly due to 
the unequal incidence of employment breaks, in particular family-related career interruptions 
(Beblo and Wolf 2002, Kunze 2005). During an employment break different forces are at 
work which result in future wage cuts. In principle, one can distinguish between missing 
experience, human capital decay and additional, productivity-related effects. Productivity-
related effects may either reflect an actual drop in productivity or may be attributed to a 
stigma imposed by the demand side of the labor market. Participation in continuous training 
programs may not only help to fill the gaps in one’s knowledge, but also act as a positive 
signal to current or future employers.  
Apart from that, the ongoing technological and organizational change increases the demand 
for continuous training. Hence, access to training activities accomplishes a key role among 
the human resource measures potentially reducing the GWG. From an economic point of 
view, there exist good arguments to belief that corporate training programs are aligned with 
the requirements and time schedule of men. Since the firm’s benefit of continuous training 
increases with the employee’s number of working hours and his or her solidarity, firms are 
likely to invest more in male employees who traditionally work more hours and are less 
mobile (Knoke and Ishio 1998, OECD 2002). Furthermore, it is argued that education and 
training are complements, which is supported by the evidence that high-educated and high-
wage workers are trained more (see the recent surveys of Asplund 2004, Leuven 2005 or 
Bassanini et al. 2005). This purely economic calculus would generate lower participation 
rates in training programs among women. According to the official report on training in 
Germany, the participation rate in continuous training among women increased from 6% in 
1979 to 24% in 2003. But still men participate more in continuous training than women. 
Considering, however, that women are more likely to work reduced hours and that part-time 
workers exhibit lower participation rates than full-timers (29% vs. 36%), this result reverses 
 8
if we account for differences in working hours. Among full-time employees, the 
participation rate in continuous training amounts to 40% for women and only 34% for men 
(BMBF 2006). These figures hint at the expected result that part-time workers have reduced 
access to further education, but that managers seem to have good reasons to invest in women 
– be it because they are more motivated, they generate higher positive external effects 
because they are more likely to share their knowledge with others or because they feel more 
committed to their sponsoring employer. Considering that women seem to yield higher 
returns to training (see e.g. Pischke 2001), we will explore whether in-plant training 
programs and furthermore the share of female participation help to overcome wage 
differences between male and female employees or not. 
An additional pervasive effect on the wage gap between men and women should be achieved 
by corporate agreements to foster equal opportunities of women and men. Establishments 
that commit themselves to the equalization of gender are presumably more aware of 
discriminating work processes, pay schemes and training conditions. At most, they may 
draw on professional consulting to reshape their workplace such that it satisfies the 
requirements of specific certificates (such as the audit “BERUF & FAMILIE” in Germany). 
The awarding of such an official seal may depend on the working hours policy2, the 
opportunity to take sabbaticals, the career opportunities of male and female employees, the 
(financial) support of child care facilities, the extent of gender segregation within the 
establishment or programs to help mothers or other individuals with career interruptions to 
integrate into employment. In any case, we expect that firms that decided to equalize the 
professional opportunities of men and women are more likely to implement some of these 
human resource measures and thus exhibit smaller wage gaps. Since our knowledge on these 
commitments is restricted to two brief questions in our data, we will exploit this information 
to test whether the wage difference between men and women corresponds to this firm policy.  
Even if the information on the training activities as well as the use of innovative workplace 
practices represent crucial features of the firm philosophy and policy, our knowledge on the 
actual organizational structure and other human resource projects is very fragmented. It is 
hence straightforward to look for other observable variables which presumably correlate 
with firm policy. In the literature, the role of firm age is primarily analyzed with respect to 
                                                          
2 In principle, flexible working hours are an effective means to help women balancing home and work 
responsibilities. In practice, flextime may, however, imply that employees are supposed to be available all day 
long. Which of the converse implications dominate, crucially depends upon the initial motive for work time 
flexibility and the actual implementation in the corresponding establishment. Given our limited information on 
the exact use of flexible work schedules, we do not analyze this question in our empirical model.   
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gender segregation. Arguments mainly rely on the perception that new founded 
organizations are strongly driven by structures and practices that correspond to broad, 
cohort-specific social understandings about how an organization ought to be run (Baron 
1991). Metaphorically speaking, the norms and ideals present at the time of an 
organization’s founding are imprinted on its structure, norms and behaviour and will persist 
through time (Baron and Newman 1990). Hence, new founded organizations are supposed to 
be more likely to integrate women in all hierarchical levels and tasks than older 
organizations that were founded when offering women only bad paying jobs was considered 
business as usual (see e.g. Baron, Mittman and Newman 1991 or Huffman 1999 for 
segregation in managerial positions). Concerning the wage structure within firms, one could 
also argue that firms founded in times of increased emancipation and integration of women 
in the labor market as well as the awareness of substantial and persistent skill gaps are less 
likely to discriminate against women. We will test this hypothesis by including an indicator 
whether the establishment is founded before or after 1990.  
3. The data source 
The effects of firm policy on the wage inequality within firms can be evaluated best with 
data including linked information on employers and employees. Thus, the data set we use is 
constructed by merging the IAB-establishment panel and the IAB employment statistic of 
the German Federal Services based on a unique firm identification number.  
The IAB- establishment panel is an annual survey of German establishments, which started 
in West-Germany in 1993 and was extended to East Germany in 1996.3 The sample of 
selected establishments is random and stratified by industries firm size classes and regions. 
The data is collected by personal interviews with the owners or senior managers of smaller 
establishments and personnel managers in larger establishments. It is performed by specially 
trained professional interviewers from a well-known market research institute. As far as 
possible, the survey is carried out by the same interviewer and interviewee each year. This 
procedure ensures a response rate above 70% which is high compared to other non-official 
German establishment panel studies (Kölling 2000) and helps to reduce panel attrition to less 
than 20% per year.4 In order to keep the panel representative and correct for panel mortality, 
                                                          
3 Detailed information on the IAB-establishment panel is given by Kölling (2000). 
4 The establishments are first approached by a letter indicating the goals of the survey. This letter is accompanied 
by separate letters of recommendation by the president of the Federal Employment Services and the leader of the 
German employer’s association. Some weeks after this announcement letter, the establishment is contacted by 
telephone in order to arrange an individual appointment for the interview. 
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exits, and newly-founded units, additional establishments are drawn each year, yielding an 
unbalanced panel. These additional establishments are stratified with respect to ten 
categories of establishment size and 34 economic sectors.  
The sample unit is the establishment as the local business unit. Assuming that human 
resource management varies within multiple establishment firms, we believe that the 
establishment is the preferred level of analysis for this research question. Note that firm and 
establishment are used as synonyms in this paper, though. The establishments asked in the 
survey are selected from the parent sample of all German establishments that employ at least 
one employee covered by social security. Thus, self-employed and establishments that 
employ only people not covered by social security (mineworkers, farmers, artists, journalists, 
etc.) as well as public employers with solely civil servants do not belong to the original 
sample. The data set is a representative sample of German establishments employing at least 
one employee who pays social security contributions. The establishments covered by the 
survey have been questioned every year about turnover, number of employees, personnel 
problems, industrial relations, wage policies, apprenticeship training, investments, 
innovations, and business strategies. From time to time, additional topics, such as training, 
pay systems and human resource policies, were added to the questionnaire. 
The IAB employment statistic of the German Federal Services, so-called Employment 
Statistics Register, is an administrative panel data set of all employees in Germany paying 
social security contributions.5 The Employment Statistics are collected by the social 
insurance institutions for their purposes according to a procedure introduced in 1973. These 
data cover the period between 1975 and 2003, that is, every person who was employed for at 
least one day from 1975 to 2003 and/or with claims to pension benefits is included.6 During 
this time, social security contributions were mandatory for all employees who earned more 
than a lower earnings limit. Civil servants, self employed and people with marginal jobs, that 
is, employees whose earnings are below a lower earnings limit or temporary jobs which last 
50 working days at most, are not covered by this sample. Altogether, the Employment 
Statistics Register represents about 80 percent of all West German employees. According to 
the statutory provisions, employers have to report information for all employed contributors 
at the beginning and end of their employment spells. In addition an annual report for each 
                                                          
5 Information on the Employment Statistics Register is given by Bender, Haas and Klose (2000). 
6 These are people who, as employees, have paid contributions to the pension system or who have been covered 
by the pension system through contributions by the unemployment insurance or by being a parent (depending on 
the birth year of the child, a fixed number of years is counted as child caring time during which the non-working 
parent becomes entitled to receive pension benefits). 
 11
employee is compulsory at the end of a year. This report contains information on an 
employee’s occupation, the occupational status, qualification, sex, age, nationality, industry 
and the size of the employer. Also the available information on daily gross earnings refers to 
employment spells that employers report to the Federal Employment Service.7 If the wage 
rate exceeds the upper earnings limit (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”), the daily social security 
threshold is reported instead.8 Note that the daily wage rate is therefore censored from above 
– mostly relevant for men.  
Both data sets contain a unique firm identifier which is used to match information on all 
employees paying social security contributions with the establishment in the IAB-
establishment panel. Due to the lack of explicit information to working hours9 we consider 
only full-time employees. In order to avoid modelling human capital formation and 
retirements decisions, we also drop individuals younger than 20 and older than 60.  
Furthermore, we exclude firms which employ less than 20 full-time employed men and 
women respectively who are subject to social insurance contributions and aged between 20 
and 60 years, because the calculation of a firm-specific GWG is statistically not very robust. 
Finally, we restrict our sample to West German establishments of the private sector who 
participated in the IAB-establishment panel in one year from 1998 to 2003. In contrast to the 
private industry, pay systems in the public sector are highly centralized and regulated by the 
Federal Act on the Remuneration of Civil Servants (Bundesbesoldungsgesetz). This bill 
requires equal pay for all individuals with the same seniority and qualification who work in a 
specific job. As a result, the GWG in the public sector is significantly lower than in private 
firms (see e.g. Melly 2005). Furthermore, we expect little or no impact of personnel policy 
on the firm-specific gender wage gap in the public sector. East German firms are not 
considered in the analysis, because both the wage level, the GWG as well as the wage setting 
process is still very different. Given that many East-German firms are founded after the 
German Unification, firm philosophy and the type and degree of organizational change may 
differ tremendously by region. Even if our data provide a set of variables describing these 
differences, we can only account for a small part of the regional firm heterogeneity. Hence, a 
common investigation of both regions would not be very meaningful. A separate analysis for 
                                                          
7 To deal with the problem of overlapping spells, we apply a hierarchical order of activities where employment 
trumps all other activities.  
8 Fitzenberger and Wunderlich (2000) show that this affects particularly the wage rate of high-skilled employees. 
According to their results, about 50 percent of high-skilled men earn wages above the upper earnings limit. 
Among high-skilled full-time females, this share amounts to at least 20 percent.  
9 The data set only distinguishes between full- and part-time workers whereby, for instance, part-time can mean 
4 or 6 hours per day.  
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East Germany is not possible either, because the number of larger firms is too small to derive 
reliable results. Apart from that, the wage setting process and the resulting GWG in East 
German establishments is likely to be driven by internal processes, which can not be 
captured by our data, such as the financial devaluation of female labor as well as the 
crowding out of working women, in particular women in occupations which were dominated 
by females in East Germany before unification.  
4. Implementing theory in an empirical model   
The empirical assessment of all these interactions between personnel policy, organizational 
change or pay systems and the GWG within establishments requires a rich data base of 
linked employer-employee information. To minimize the computational costs, we apply a 
two-step procedure, which subsumes the individual-specific information in the first stage 
into firm-specific variables in the second estimation step.  
The basic idea of our approach is that we define a firm-specific GWG as dependent variable 
and regress this measure on explanatory variables derived from the theoretical hypothesis 
expounded in Section 2. The sources of the observed wage gap within establishments can be 
manifold. On the one hand male and female employees differ with regard to their human 
capital endowment and other labor market relevant characteristics. On the other hand the 
endowments of men and women are remunerated in different ways. Finally, workplace 
characteristics may effectively determine the size of the GWG. Since we want to assess the 
effect of personnel policy, organizational change or pay systems on “unexplained” wage 
differences between men and women, our measure of firm-specific GWG should be adjusted 
by wage difference due to gaps in occupational skills, human capital or other observable 
characteristics. The dependent variable Gap  is hence defined as follows:  j
( )fijmjmijmjobsjj XXGapGap ββ ˆˆ     (1) −−=
                                                          
obs
jGap  represents the observed wage gap within firm j. Since the wage information in our 
data set is right-censored, the observed wage gap underestimates the actual raw wage 
differential. In order to determine the actual observed wage gap we apply a simple Tobit 
model.10 By estimating the following equation for each firm j, we can directly derive the 
firm-specific wage differential between male and female employees: 
10 Alternatively, we could use imputed wage information which is available in the data. However these wage 
rates are estimated in a different model. Thus other explanatory variables and a different sample are used to 
explain the wages.  
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where the dependent variable ln wij denotes the log earnings for individual i at firm j. α  is 
an absolute term measuring the average wage rate in firm j,  is a dummy variable 
reflecting the gender of individual i and 
fem
ijμ  denotes the error term. The estimated 
coefficients jγˆ  then represents the raw GWG in firm j ( ) taking into account that wij 
is censored from above. 
obs
jGap
To adjust the observed wage gap by differences in human capital (see equation (1)), we use 
the vector ijX  which includes mean characteristics of the individuals i at firm j.  is a 
vector of estimated coefficients – derived from wage regressions – of the individual 
characteristics Xij of male employees in firm j. Hence,  reflects the difference in the 
rewards for individual human capital characteristics as well as earnings differences due to 
workplace characteristics and unobserved wage effects between male and female employees 
within each firm j. Note that the calculation of this measure requires the estimation of wage 
equations for male employees only. One innovation of our study is the firm-specific 
estimation of wage equations, which allows for the heterogeneity and complexity of the 
The dependent variable describes the daily log wage rate. We restrict the wage eq
m
jβˆ
jGap
wage setting process. We hence estimate separate wage equations for each firm j: 
uation to a 
employees: 
,ln    )2( ijijjjij femw α γ ++=
m
ij
m
ij
m
j
m
ij Xw εβ +=ln    )3(
μ
standard Mincer equation aiming to adjust the observed wage rate by differences in human 
capital endowments between men and women. Since other possible wage determinants, such 
as the occupational status and the occupational group are determined by human capital, we 
exclude them from our wage equation. Therefore, Xijm includes potential experience 
(squares), dummy variables for different education levels and job tenure. The right-censoring 
of the dependent variable again requires the estimation of a Tobit model. In order to make 
sure that our firm-specific wage estimations are statistically meaningful, we restrict this 
procedure to firms with at least hundred male full-time employees. The estimation of firm-
specific wage rates is especially suitable to accommodate the heterogeneity of wage-setting 
processes among firms. This benefit is, however, only feasible at the expense of the number 
of considered firms. In order to maximize the number of establishments in the second 
estimation step, we determine the GWG in firms with less than hundred male employees by 
running a pooled wage regression for all establishments with twenty up to ninety-nine male 
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In contrast to equation (3), where we determine firm-specific coefficients (βj), we now 
estimate the average impact of human capital characteristics in all smaller firms (β). By 
describes the GWG within firms assuming that men had the same huma ent 
y wit
g izational change and pay systems on the wage 
The GWG which is adjusted for the difference in human capital characteristics is assumed to 
 including firm characteristics and information on workplace policy 
e variable under 
                                                          
applying different strategies for smaller and larger firms, we are able to determine the 
adjusted wage gap for the vast majority of the establishments in our sample.  
Given the results of equation (3) and (4) respectively, we can calculate Gap  which j
n capital endowm
as women within a firm. In other words, Gap  describes the within-firm GWG adjusted by 
observed differences in human capital. Note, however, that part of the differences in 
characteristics may be caused by inequalit h respect to access and the encouragement to 
education, though. Furthermore, there might be a discriminating element in the selection of 
employees such that observed characteristics of employees as well as estimated coefficients 
are not distributed randomly across firms.
j
11  
Using this measure of firm-specific wage differentials as dependent variable allows us to 
analyze the effect of personnel policy, or an
inequality within firms.  
 
depend on the vector Zj
of firm j. δ captures the impact of the corresponding explanatory variables, derived from the 
theories expounded in Section 2. In this second estimation step we can exploit the panel 
structure of the data by applying a random effects model. As a result, firm specific 
heterogeneity is captured by the random effect determined by the estimation model. Even if 
it was straightforward to apply a random effects Tobit model in the first estimation step, we 
currently refrain from this approach because of computer time restrictions.  
A general issue in assessing the effect of workplace practices is that the firm’s decision to 
use innovative human resource measures may be driven by the outcom
consideration (see e.g. OECD 1999), because the estimated parameters are then likely to be 
biased due to endogeneity. In our setting, this problem would become relevant if establish-
ments with high gender wage gaps were more or less likely to foster employee involvement, 
ii
mmmm
i Xw εβ +=ln    )4(
(5)   .         j j jGap Zδ ε= +
11 In order to correct for this selection we would have to estimate employment probabilities (Datta Gupta, 1993). 
Due to the lack of information on the household context and the individual background, it is difficult to 
implement this procedure which requires convincing exclusion restrictions.   
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incentive pay systems, training activities or gender equality. Assuming that firms have strong 
preferences for equality between male and female employees and our selected human 
resource practices are regarded as efficient means to limit discrimination, the estimated 
coefficients tend to be upward biased, because there are unobserved characteristics which are 
positively correlated with both, small GWGs and the use of innovative personnel policy. Our 
estimation results may then be interpreted as upper bounds of the actual effect. We argue, 
however, that equality is presumably not the driving force when thinking about organiza-
tional change with all its different aspects. There exists consistent evidence that 
technological changes (see e.g. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2002) and productivity 
shocks strongly affect the use of innovative workplace practices (see e.g. Nickell, Nicolitsas 
and Patterson 2001 or OECD 1999). In that case, our estimation is not biased due to 
endogeneity.  
Another concern that should be considered is the effect of unobserved heterogeneity and 
omitted variables. It is well documented in the literature that the adoption of new workplace 
Due to our strict selection criterions, it may be argued that our sample represents a biased 
s of firm size 
practices is often driven by innovations in the production process or changes on the product 
market. If these underlying events evoke a direct effect on the GWG within firms, the omis-
sion of these variables would result in upward biased coefficients of our selected firm policy 
variables. Since especially changes in the production technology might affect male and 
female wages in different ways, we try to limit this bias by using all available information of 
the technical state and innovations in the production process. Finally it may be argued that 
firms with innovative workplace practices and establishments with more traditional human 
resource policies differ in many other dimensions we cannot control for. Tanks to our rich 
data set we can use detailed information on all kinds of firm-characteristics which allows us 
to extract much of the usually unobserved establishment-specific effects. Apart from that, we 
exploit the panel structure of our data in order to account for unobserved heterogeneity. 
5. A rough picture of selected variables in our sample 
picture of entrepreneurship in Germany. Table 1 hence provides the distribution
and industries in the original LIAB data and our selected sub-sample. The most striking 
difference between our sample and the representative LIAB data concerns the low share of 
small establishments. Because of the exclusion of establishments with less than 20 male or 
female full-time employees aged between 20 and 60 years, the share of workplaces with 20 
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to 49 employees is less than 1 percent. As a consequence, larger firms (with more than 100 
employees) are rather overrepresented in our sample. This selection is not completely 
harmless with respect to the distribution of industries. While the manufacturing sector is 
more pronounced in our data, we are missing firms in the construction and firm-related 
service sectors as well as the trade and repair industry. Given that establishments in these 
sectors are generally not that big, this result is not really surprising. Summing up, our sample 
is biased towards bigger firms to some extent. Keeping these differences in mind, we argue 
that we can nonetheless derive interesting and new conclusion form our analyses. 
Table 1: Firm size and industry distribution in the LIAB data and our sample (2001)
Firm size Shares . . .  Industry Share
 
s . . . 
 in the 
LIAB 
in our 
sample 
 in the 
LIAB sa
in our 
mple 
20 – 49 employees 29 1 forestry and mining 2 15 .47 0.6 Farming, .59 2.
50 – 99 empl. anufacturing 20.01 7.03 M 34.23 42.83 
100 – 199 empl. 15.92 18.73 Construction 6.60 1.05 
200 – 499 empl. 17.56 33.11 Trade and repair 13.4 9.25 
500 – 999 empl. 9.45 21.79 Communication and i
transmission 
nformation 5.18 3.68 
1000 – 4999 empl. ce industry 6.93 17.08 Credit and insuran 4.65 9.64 
5000 – 9999 empl. 10.38 0.99 Firm-related services 0.90 7.49 
> 10000 empl. 0.27 0.66 Other services  19.6 20.88 9 
   Lobbies 2.75 2.62 
Note: The sample includes rkpla th , which do not re e public sector 
ocial sec nd d ). her excludes establish ho ime 
mployees aged between 20 and 0 year re sol r female.   
re insight into the distribution of 
our dependent variable. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the calculated GWG in all firms of 
omen would earn 
lower wage rates. 
 all wo ces wi  20 and more employees fer to th
(civil services, s urity a efense Our sample furt ments w se full-t
e  6 s a ely male o
Source: LIAB-Data 2001. 
Before looking at the estimation results, we want to give mo
our sample. Gap has a mean of 0.14 and the standard deviation amounts to 0.16. Selected 
points of the distribution are presented in Table 2. Furthermore, this table contains the mean 
gap by year and the corresponding number of observations. While the observed GWG within 
firms decreases by about 1 percentage point between 1998 and 2003, the average wage 
differences between men and women calculated under the assumption that male employees 
had the same characteristics as female employees (Gap) remained rather constant over time. 
This implies that the share of “unexplained” pay gap increased over time.  
The distribution of the adjusted GWG reveals that more than 5 % of the establishments 
exhibit negative gaps, implying that men with the same characteristics as w
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Figure 1: Kernel estimation of the firm-specific GWG  
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Note: Gap describes the gender wage gap under the assumption that male employees had the same 
characteristics as female employees. This measure accommodates the censoring of our wage variable by 
applying Tobit estimates.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1998-2003 
Gap d the ge age ga wages) u assumption  employees had the 
harac s d GW ibes the raw e between
 wage irm  
: own on; I a 1998
g the firm-specific GWG. Along the way, we 
expound the exact definition of our human resource variables. Table 3 reveals that almost 
60% of the establishment in our sample enforced organisational changes until the year 2001. 
across firms)  establishm. 
Table 2: Distribution and evolution of the firm-specific GWG 
Percentil Gap  Year Mean(Gap) Mean(Gapobs)  Mean( Gapobs Number of 
5% -0.0039  1998 0.1335 0.2209 0.2208 1278 
10% 0.0216  1999 0.1329 0.2175 0.2207 1283 
 
 
    
25% 0.0696  2000 0.1411 0.2205 
Note: 
same c
escribes 
teristics a
nder w
ale employees. The observe
p (in log nder the 
G descr
that male
 differencfem  male and 
female s within f s. 
Source  calculati  L AB-Dat -2003 
Finally
0.2238 
0.2152 
1850 
2120 50% 0.1219 2001 0.1381 0.2159 
75% 0.1899  2002 0.1346 0.2144 0.2185 1951 
95% 0.3263  2003 0.1348 0.2106 0.2280 2040 
mean 0.1362   
, w o v  a brief look into the nature of innovativ irm policy by comparing 
firm characteristics of “adopters” and “non-adopters” of the human resource measures and 
firm characteristics presumably affectin
e want t ha e e f
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The exact wording of the underlying question is: “Have there been one or more of the 
following organizational changes in your establishment during the last two years?” Possible 
answers are (among others): “Shift of responsibility and decisions to lower levels of 
hierarchy”, “Introduction of team work/self-responsible teams”, and “Introduction of units 
with own cost/result determination”. This question is asked in the years 2001, 2000, 1998 
and 1995. Our indicator for the use of human resource practices fostering employee 
involvement is set to one if the establishment answered yes to one of the alternatives in the 
years 2001, 2000 or 1998. The resulting variable tells us if one of these measures has been 
introduced until the end of 2001. Establishments with and without movements towards 
participative organisation structures differ especially with respect to firm size (measured by 
the number of employees). Since adopting firms are about twice as large as establishments 
that did not adopt any of the selected human resource measures within our observation 
period, they pay higher wages and are more likely to have works councils and follow 
collective agreements. Finally, we can see that both the adjusted GWG – that is, the 
dependent variable in our empirical analysis – as well as the observed GWG is larger in non-
adopting firms.  
Incentive pay schemes are less prevalent than organisational changes in our sample. This 
information is based on questions in the years 1998, 2000, and 2001. In 2000 and 2001 the 
wording of the underlying question is: “Which additional financial incentives do you offer to 
employees in your establishment?” Possible answers are: “Profit sharing” and “Employee 
share ownership”. In 1998, the question is more general, that is we can not distinguish 
between profit sharing and employee share ownership. The amount of disbursed 
compensation is unfortunately not available. As we do not know the date when these 
measures were implemented, we derive our conclusions form differences between 
establishments that introduced these human resource practices until 2001 and those that did 
not. More than one third of the establishments in our data either provide profit sharing or 
employee share ownership programs. Again, adopters and non-adopters differ primarily in 
terms of firm size. Apart from that, the female share in establishments offering incentive pay 
systems is somewhat lower. Furthermore, the average wage rate as well as the technical state 
of the art is higher in adopting firms. Despite these diverse differences between adopters and 
non-adopters of performance related pay systems, it is interesting to note that the differences 
in the GWG are ignorable. This descriptive result leads one to suppose that performance 
related pay systems do not contribute to more gender equality.  
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Table 3: Firm characteristics of “adopters” and “non-adopters” of selected human resource 
measures in 2001 
 OC Incentive 
pay 
Formation 
before 1990 
Training Equal 
opportunities a
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Share of firms 58.2 41.8 36.6 63.4 11.5 88.5 93.9 6.1 37.0 63.0 
Share of women 0.40 0.45 0.37 0.46 0.37 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.
Share of women 
40 
ith fix-term 
contracts 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.09 
irm size b 
 0
0.91 0.85 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.71 0.96 0.85 
t  
4.92 4.79 5.32 4.61 5.00 4.86 4.91 4.17 5.20 5.12 
w
 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.07 
F
(in 1000 empl.) 0.98 0.55 1.13 0.61 0.78 0.81 0.83 .26 1.26 0.54 
Working hours 
  c
37.4 37.9 37.3 37.8 37.7 37.6 37.6 37.8 37.6 37.6 
Works council  
Coll. 
Agreemen c 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.77 0.92 0.79 
Wage rate 
State of the art  2.91 2.95 3.01 2.88 2.97 2.92 2.94 2.77 2.95 2.91 
Adjusted GWG 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.15 
Observed GWG 0.20 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.22 
Note: a
Source: LIAB
 The information on equal opportunity programs refer to the year 2002; b in 1000 employees; c in percent.  
-Data 20  20
abli t nd fo  after 1990 can not be de  a do
 measure in the strict sens a tu w im nt m
 ap h, ph ph  th na nt . I da o
ded after the German Unification. Not surprisingly, younger 
firms employ less staff than long-established firms. The difference is, however, not much 
01 and 02. 
Whether an est shmen is fou ed be re or noted s an a pted 
human resource e, it m y cap re, ho ever, porta  infor ation 
on the corporate proac  firm iloso y and e ma geme  style n our ta, ab ut 12 
percent of all firms were foun
pronounced. Nonetheless, firms founded after 1990 are less subject to collective agreements 
and are less likely to have works councils. A rather striking difference is that newly founded 
firms employ fewer women and pay higher wage rates. Furthermore, the share of fixed-term 
contracts among the female employees is about 3 percentage points higher. Given that 
between 1995 and 2002 more than half of the newly founded firms refer to consumption-
related services this finding is even more surprising. Note, however, that the share of 
company formations in the knowledge-based service sector – which are paying relatively 
high wage rates – increased from 12% in 1995 to 15% in the year 2000 (Rammer 2004). 
Differences with respect to the average number of working hours and the state of the art are 
not very pronounced. Compared to the other human resource measures, the “impact” on the 
observed and adjusted GWG seems to be more important. For instance, the observed firm-
specific GWG is about 4 percentage points larger in establishments founded before 1990.  
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The support for continuous training is very widespread among German workplaces. Almost 
94 percent either directly pay for training or provide special (day-)releases from work. 
Differences between training and non-training firms are substantial, though. First of all, 
establishments offering opportunities to invest in their human capital are more than three 
998 only includes a general question 
time larger than the rest of our sample. Consequently, the share of firms covered by 
collective agreements or works councils is higher among training firms. Also differences 
with respect to the female share, the average wage rate and the state-of-the-art are more 
pronounced compared to the adopters and non-adopters of other human resource practices. 
Establishments with training activities employ more women, pay higher wage rates 
(presumably because they make their employees more productive) and are better technically 
equipped (which may require more training). Considering that the support of training 
activities is not correlated (much) with the observed and adjusted GWG, women do not seem 
to benefit notably from advanced continuous training.  
Finally, we consider crucial characteristics of firms with agreements to foster equal 
opportunities of women and men. While the corresponding question in 2002 distinguishes 
between corporate agreements, commitments resulting from collective agreements and 
purely voluntary arrangements, the questionnaire for 1
on equal opportunity agreements. Comparable information of the other years is missing. In 
2002, about 37 percent of all establishments in our sample report that they are subject to any 
type of equal opportunity agreement. Four years before, the corresponding share amounts to 
24 percent only. In accordance with all other human resource measures, adopting firms 
employ more workers and hence the share of establishments with works councils or 
collective agreements is higher. Also not surprisingly, the female share is much higher in 
workplaces looking at equal opportunities. This result is consistent with the idea that either 
women select into firms that provide the best conditions to realize their career plans or 
establishments employing many women are more likely to be open-minded about equal 
opportunity programs. The number of working hours, the average wage rate as well as the 
technical state of the art does not really vary among adopters and non-adopters in this case. 
The difference with respect to the observed and adjusted GWG implies that firms whose firm 
policy includes measures to equalize the career opportunities of men and women actually 
exhibit smaller GWGs. All in all, we conclude that workplaces adopting specific human 
resource measures also tend to be “different” in many other respects. Final conclusions on 
the effect of selected characteristics of human resource policy can hence only be derived 
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from multivariate analysis. In the following, we will present the results of our two-step 
estimation model.  
6. Estimation results  
6.1 First estimation step: wage regression  
 under the assumption that male employees had the same 
characteristics as female employees within each firm, we first have to determine wage 
s with at least 100 full-time male 
No. of 
Obs. 
Mean of 
the coeff.
Mean of 
the 
Share of 
significant 
Standard 
deviation 
To calculate the within-firm GWG
estimates for all establishments in our sample. For firm
employees, we estimate 2200 wage equations with a Tobit model in order to account for the 
censoring. The estimated firm-specific wage coefficients are used to determine our 
dependent variable according to equation (1). We do not apply this estimation strategy to 
firms with fewer employees, because the within-firm estimation would yield no reliable 
results. In this case, we estimate a pooled wage equation across all firms. Our wage equation 
is a Mincer-type specification, thus we suppose that the individual wage rate is determined 
by age, age squared, job tenure and the education level. Year dummies are added in all wage 
equations. 
Table 4: Coefficients of the wage estimations in a Tobit model (firms ≥ 100 male full-time 
employees) 
Coefficien
t-value coeff.  of coeff. 
ts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quotient 
(5)/(2) 
Age 2,200 0.0427 6.84 0.86 0.0293 0.69 
(Age)2/100 
Job tenure (in days) 2,20 0.19 1.88 
education without 
ional training -0.55 
2,200 -0.0004 -5.81 0.81 0.0003 -0.76 
0 0.1054 6.57 0.81 77 
Low 
vocat 1,437 -0.4003 -9.97 0.88 0.2218 
Vocational training 
ith and 
ng) 1,163 0.0912 1.86 0.75 0.3187 3.50 
ucation 
2,161 -0.0938 -3.10 0.77 0.2620 -2.79 
Secondary school (w
without vocational traini
College of higher ed
or university 1,605 0.3595 9.68 0.85 0.2467 0.69 
N age regressions in firms with at least 100 male full-time employees and 20  full-
t t co nta mber o rent est  coefficients. The n o 
c the estim ted coefficients and t-val es. The um he share
e  significant at the 5%-level. The 5th column contains the standard deviation of 
t efficients from the m ffic  firms. The last colum udes t betw e 
ote: Coefficients result from w
ime female employees. The firs
olumns present the means of 
lumn co
a
ins the nu f diffe
u
imated
4th col
ext tw
 of n shows t
stimated coefficients which are
he estimated co ean coe ient of all n incl  a quotien een th
mean of the coefficients and the corresponding standard deviation as absolute values.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1998-2003. 
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Since the estimated coefficients from the 2576 large firms can not be displayed in detail, we 
present a summary of the firm-specific estimation results in larger firms in Table 4. 
Column 1 describes the number of estimated coefficients for each characteristic. Note that 
fficients 
of the firm-specific wage estimations and column 3 shows the corresponding mean of the 
some characteristics are missing in some firms, such that specific coefficients can not be 
determined in every firm. The second column presents the mean of the estimated coe
estimated t-values. Note that the table contains coefficients for all possible education levels 
because the left-out category differs from firm to firm. The means of the estimated 
coefficients show that the variables have the expected effect on the wage rate. That is, the 
wage rate increases with the education level and potential experience on average. In order to 
receive a more exact impression of the significance of the estimated coefficient, column 4 
shows the shares of the estimated coefficients which are significant at the 5%-level. We can 
see that about 75 to 90 percent of the estimated coefficients are statistically different from 
zero. Furthermore, the table includes the mean standard deviation of the estimated 
coefficients to illustrate the heterogeneity of the wage regressions across firms (see column 
5). The last column includes a quotient of the standard deviation of the coefficients and the 
absolute value of the corresponding means. Hence, this figure illustrates the standardized 
variation of coefficients across the firms. High values of this quotient indicate that the 
variation of firm-specific coefficients is high, supporting our supposition that the wage 
setting process differs tremendously across firms. Small values are signaling moderate 
heterogeneity of wage returns to the corresponding characteristics. The results in Table 4 
point out, for example, that the remuneration of job tenure varies much more across firms 
than the coefficients for age. In consideration of the varying coefficients, the wage 
estimation in each firm seems to be advantageously to determine the correct remuneration of 
the characteristics. 
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Table 5: Coefficients of the pooled wage estimations in a Tobit model (firms with 20 to 99 full-
time male employees) 
Coefficients Standard deviation 
of coefficients 
t-value  
Age 0.0599 0.0006 106.3600 
Age2/100 -0.0006 0.0000 
0.0008
-90.9500 
Job tenure (in days) 0.0701  83.4300 
education without vocational 
-
Low 
training -0.3254 0.0023 143.4100 
Vocational training (reference group) 
 0.4335 0.0021 210.620
187,920 
- - - 
Secondary school (with and without 
vocational training) 0.1701 0.0026 64.9200 
College of higher education or university 0 
No. of observations 
Log likelihood -54,546.86 
Note: The regression includes male employee
20 female full-time employees.  
s from fir 0 to 99 male fu ployees a  
 LIAB-Data 1998-2003. 
 based on the wage estimates presented above, we 
can assess the effect of personnel policy and other firm characteristics on the within wage 
ms with 2 ll-time em nd more than
Source: own calculation;
6.2 Second estimation step: explaining the firm-specific gender wage gap  
Once the firm-specific GWG is calculated
differences between male and female employees. In the second estimation step, we therefore 
regress selected firm-level and industry-level variables on the adjusted firm-specific wage 
gaps. Since the variance of the calculated gender wage gap varies by firm size per definition, 
we calculate robust standard errors accommodating heteroscedasty in the dependent variable. 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of three alternative specifications of the random 
effects model. Model 1 represents the baseline model including the central information on 
the actual personnel policy, that is, organisational change, incentive pay, continuous training 
and the period of foundation. Since the number of average contracted full-time working 
hours within each establishment – which turns out to be an important determinant of the 
GWG – is not available in 2003, we extrapolate the working hours from 2002 to the 
subsequent year. Model 2 further exploits the available information on corporate training 
activities. Note, however, that the corresponding questions are missing in the years 1998, 
2000 and 2002 such that the number of observations is significantly lower in this 
specification. To use as much information as possible, we decide to estimate this model for 
the years 1999, 2001 and 2003 and extrapolate the working hours from 2002 to the 
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subsequent year.12 In order to measure the effect of equal opportunity programs, we specify 
a model including the corresponding information for 1998 and 2002. As a result, we need to 
skip the training variables (Model 3). Accordingly, the number of observations is lowest in 
Model 3 (2388 establishments) and highest in Model 1 (4898 establishments).  
Table 6: Estimation results  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value 
Constant 0.1 2.23 0.07 1.55 -0.0 -1.04035 78 732 
Employees (in 1000) 
Employees
-0.0114 -8.03 -0.0134 -6.59 -0.0093 -5.26
2 (in 1000) 
ix-term 
- - - - -
0.0019 1.39 0.0033 1.73 0.0035 1.42
t in information and 
technology  -
- - - - -
-0.0069 -1.73 -0.013 -2.61 -0.0153 -2.2
- -
lective 
- -
-0.0100 -3.46 -0.011 -2.98 -0.0081 -2.09
y 
-
pants -
f all training 
-0.0041 -1.2
4,898  3,298 2,388 
0.0003
0.0191
4.67
2.11
0.0004
0.0353
3.23
3.06
0.0002 4.67
0.0436 Share of women 
Share of w men with 
3.13
o f
contracts -0.0189 1.72 0.0193 1.24 0.0213 1.06
Working hours 0.0021 1.72 0.0028 2.13 0.0078 4.28
State of the art 
Investmen
communication 0.0018 0.78 0.0000 0.01 0.0064 1.47
Works council -0.0274 3.99 0.0284 3.53 0.0381 3.97
Collective agreement 
Average wage rate 0.0012 1.54 0.0017 1.64 0.0027 2.96
Wage rate > col
agreement 0.0093 3.70 0.0168 4.97 0.0097 2.18
Founded after 1990 -0.0095 1.35 -0.014 1.64 -0.0217 -3.16
Organisational change 
Incentive pa 0.0017 0.78 0.0009 0.26 0.0057 1.55
Continuous training -0.0099 -2.38 0.0079 -1.25 - -
Share of training partici - - 0.0058 -1.79   
Female share o
participants 
- -
-0.016 -2.1 - -
Equal opportunities  - - - -  5
No. of observations 
No. of groups 2,315 116 1,901 
328.65 2.3 .74 
2,
Wald Test 34 391
Roh 0.8621 0.8432 0.8414 
Note: Model 1 is estimated with a sample  the years 1999 t nd 2003. Model ased on 
 from 1999, 2001 and 2003. M includes the year and 2002 only. ls also 
e control variables for the year, the reg e industry secto
of employees limit the wage differences between men and women within the same 
                                                          
covering o 2001 a  2 is b
observations odel 3 s 1998 All mode
includ ion and th r.  
Consistent with our theoretical arguments, organisational changes fostering the participation 
establishment in all three models. This negative and significant effect may be driven by the 
fact that women benefit more from formalized opportunities to take part in decision-making 
12 Alternative specifications with respect to the working hour variable are presented in Table A4 in the appendix.  
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and the change towards more integrated tasks.13 These findings contrast with the evidence 
for Denmark, where the use of new work practices tends to widen the pay gap between men 
and women (Datta Gupta and Eriksson 2006). They argue that women may have a stronger 
preference for less hierarchical work organizations allowing for more collaboration than 
men, such that the negative effect on female wages can be interpreted as a compensating 
wage differential. Also in Canada, men seem to benefit more from self-directed work-groups 
than women (Drolet 2002). 
In contrast, incentive pay schemes do not seem to prevent wage differences between women 
and men. This result may have different explanations. If, for example, the amount of 
l ned 
                                                          
performance-related bonus depends on the base salary, the pay gap between men and women 
would not shrink, even if the bonus is strictly linked to actual productivity. Second, the 
crowding out of voluntary co-operation and intrinsic motivation of performance related pay 
systems found in some empirical analysis may be more relevant for women. Third, it is 
predominantly men who select into firms offering extensive performance pay schemes (see 
e.g. Drolet 2002 for Canada or Jirjahn and Stephan 2004 for Germany). Experiments show 
that this seems to be also true if women earned more money under the performance related 
pay scheme (Niederle and Vesterlund 2005). Finally, it may be argued that women’s 
contribution to the output is more difficult to measure, because their comparative advantages 
are typically in the field of communication, coordination and team-playing – all abilities 
which are not easy to evaluate and whose impact on firm performance in unclear. In that 
case, incentive systems based on a set of objective measures fail to reward “invisible” 
performance and hence do not help to reduce the inequality between men and women.14  
Our baseline model further indicates that firms offering continuous training programs exhibit 
lower GWGs. This result leads one to suppose that the offered training programs are a ig
with the organisational and professional requirements of women. Model 2 is augmented by 
further information on the training activities. Both the share of training participants in all 
employees as well as the female share among training participants further reduces the wage 
difference between men and women within the same firm. A Wald-test on the joint 
significances of all training variables amounts to χ2 = 16.56, which is highly significant. We 
hence conclude that part of the adjusted GWG is still caused by differences in job-related 
13 We also created an alternative measure of organizational change which cumulates all organizational changes 
aiming to foster the participation of employees. As a result, this variable exhibits a higher variance and contains 
more information on the firms’ history. Using this variable in Model 1 to 3 (see Table A6 in the appendix) 
results in almost the same effects of organizational change on the GWG. 
14 Excluding the insignificant incentive pay variable does not change the effects of the other firm characteristics 
on the GWG (see Table A5 in the appendix). 
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human capital. Presumably, these differences are triggered by the fact that women stay less 
time within the same firm and provide a higher probability of job changes.  
The effect of equal opportunity programs is consistent with our expectations, but the 
variance of the effect is rather large (see Model 3). This constricted effect of agreements to 
perfect, we further add a dummy variable that indicates whether the 
stics to control for heterogeneity. Our results indicate that bigger firms – measured 
h the comprehensive literature 
                                                          
foster gender equality is consistent with the notion that some firms implement specific 
human resource measures in the firm philosophy – partly driven by peer-group pressure or 
for the sake of publicity – the everyday life of the establishment, however, is not affected by 
these principles.  
Given that our information on the corporate culture and the personnel policy is fragmented 
and therefore im
establishment was founded before or after 1990 capturing the social norms and trends during 
the foundation period. We can show that establishments founded before 1990 differentiate 
much more between men and women than younger firms. This result may imply that the 
perception and situation of women in the society – which changed towards a more 
egalitarian role association of men and women – affects the collaboration and division of 
labor within firms. Note, however, that this effect is not significant at the 5%-level in Model 
1 and 2.  
Apart from these variables describing the firm-specific personnel policy, we add a set of firm 
characteri
by the number of employees – tend to pay relatively higher wage rates to women compared 
to men. However, the positive coefficient of the quadratic term points to the fact that the 
negative impact of the number of employees decreases at a certain firm size.15 This finding 
is consistent with the hypothesis that large firms are more in the focus of the public and 
hence evoke much civil commotion by discretionary decisions to the disadvantage of 
women. Alternatively it may be argued that male and female employees in large firms are 
more likely to work in comparable job positions (unless jobs are not fully segregated) which 
limits the potential of discrimination (see also Heinze and Wolf 2006).  
Firms with a high share of female employees exhibit higher GWGs than less segregated 
organizations. These results are not surprising and in line wit
on the wage effects of segregation within firms (see e.g. Jurajda 2005, Allmendinger und 
Podsiadlowski 2001). The share of female employees with limited contracts tends to reduce 
the earnings differential between men and women. The effect is statistically not significant, 
15 The point of inflection differs by model specification and varies between 16,750 and 23,250 employees.  
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though. It is interesting to note that establishments with longer contractual weekly working 
hours are more prone to wage differences between male and female employees. Given that 
we also control for industry sectors, collective agreements and firm size, this effect can not 
only be driven by differences in the industrial relations and the occupational structure. We, 
therefore, argue that longer working hours may be interpreted as an indicator for a human 
resource policy aligned with the time schedule of traditional bread-winners, that is, men. 
Hence, firms whose work time policy is geared to the employment behaviour of male 
employees – which are more likely to shift child care responsibilities to their wives or 
partners and accept longer weekly working hours – distinguish more between men and 
women.16  
Since in Germany, the wage setting process is not just the result of free negotiations between 
the indi idv ual and its employer, we also control for the way how the right of co-
                                                          
determination is implemented and put into practice and whether firms are subject to 
collective wage agreements or not. In accordance with earlier studies, our results indicate 
that both works councils and collective agreements are in favor of women’s relative wages 
(Gartner and Stephan 2004, Achatz, Gartner and Glück 2005, Heinze and Wolf 2006, 
Addison, Teixeira and Zwick 2006). The negative union effect may be explained by the 
reduced wage dispersion among employees covered by the same collective bargaining 
agreement (see e.g. Freeman and Medoff 1984, Fitzenberger and Kohn 2005) and the 
reduced arbitrariness in the wage setting process (Elvira and Saporta 2001). Also 
international evidence hint at limited wage dispersion in those countries with centralized 
collective bargaining, which is – to a great part – caused by a more compressed inter-firm 
wage dispersion (Blau and Kahn 1999, 2000 and 2003). The impact of works councils seems 
to be much more important, though. Works councils in German firms provide an extensive 
framework for establishment-level negotiations on wages, working hours and other working 
conditions and thus play an important role in the wage setting process. Their implementation 
is formally designated by law, but depends upon the activity of the employees. According to 
Baron (1984), work councils often act as equalizing agents by looking at the compliance of 
corporate or legal principals claiming equal opportunity and avoiding discrimination. 
Accepting the hypothesis that employees’ representations follow up the aim of reducing 
inequality among employees within firms, this finding is not surprising.  
16 To check whether this result is driven by the imputation of working hours in 2003, we run Model 1 and Model 
2 based on original working hours only. As can be seen in Table A4 in the appendix, the alternative specification 
yields almost the same results.  
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High wage level per se does not necessarily imply that the within GWG is small. In contrast, 
the positive coefficients of the wage bill per employee in Model 1 and 2 exposes that the 
g that well equipped 
mary and discussion  
The „unexplained“ part of the GWG varies between 40 and 50 percent of the total wage gap 
. According to Becker (1957), the disparate 
cesses, pay systems, internal qualification activities and the firm’s attitude 
GWG is larger in high wage firms, which is consistent with the so-called glass ceiling effect. 
According to this phenomenon, the wage rate of women is capped at a certain threshold, 
partly because women do not reach the top positions in most firms. Given that this effect is 
not significant at the 5%-significance level and even reverses in Model 3, we should be 
reluctant to jump to conclusions. The positive and significant coefficient of the dummy 
variable indicating that wage rates may exceed collective agreements corroborates our 
supposition that women benefit less from high intra-firm wage levels.   
Finally, we control for differences with respect to the technical state-of-the-art and past 
investments in information and communication technologies supposin
establishments are more likely to implement innovative work practices which make their 
investment even more productive. It may be argued, for instance, that in the course of 
technological changes, the traditional division of labor must be revised and may become 
obsolete. Hence, the chance of a more egalitarian collaboration among men and women 
increases. Another argument for including these variables is that the corporate training 
activities are likely to correlate with technological innovations and changes (due to human 
capital obsolescence) and thus tend to be biased (see e.g. Hempell 2003). The empirical 
result is, however, not in line with this train of thoughts. The effect of the technical 
equipment on the firm-specific GWG is positive and insignificant and investments in 
information and communication technologies do not affect the firm-specific gender wage 
gap at all.  
7. Sum
and is often interpreted as discrimination
remuneration of men and women is driven by an inherent taste for discrimination by 
employers. We argue that specific features of personnel policy and workplace organization 
limit the arbitrariness of managers and increase the barriers to treat men and women 
differently. As a result, innovative workplace practices may help to reduce the GWG within 
establishments.  
In this paper, we hence explore the relationship between the firm-specific design of work 
and decision pro
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towards gender equality. Based on the German LIAB data, a representative linked employer-
employee panel including information on all employees of firms covered by the IAB 
establishment survey, we provide the first approach to assess the impact of selected variables 
describing personnel policy on the level of establishments on the GWG in Germany. Our 
empirical approach is based on the within-firm gender wage differentials. Given that the 
distribution of women among firms is not random, results and interpretation of our approach 
may differ from traditional analyzes looking at overall wage differentials only.  
Consistent with the theoretical arguments, our empirical results indicate that organisational 
changes fostering the participation of employees limit the wage differences between men and 
e among 
 involvement, training or equal opportunity programs is correlated with 
of voluntary co-operation 
women within the same establishments. This effect can, for instance, be explained by the 
institutional speaking tube which helps women to play an active part in decision-making and 
reveal their competences. Apart from other interpretations, it may be argued that team work 
is likely to limit the potential of continuous unequal treatment of men and women.  
Our results further indicate that continuous training programs reduce the within-firm GWG. 
Both the share of training participants in all employees as well as the female shar
training participants further reduces the wage difference between men and women. We 
hence conclude that training helps to balance existing gender differences in job-related 
human capital. Also equal opportunity programs tend to reduce the pay differential, albeit 
the effect is not statistically significant. Note, however, that pay equality is not the ultimate 
ambition of these agreements. A judgement on the overall utility of these efforts to improve 
gender equality within firms would thus be premature, because our results just refer to the 
effect on the GWG.  
Interpreting the results, we should keep in mind that we can not absolutely rule out that the 
adoption of employee
unobserved characteristics which are positively correlated with both, small intra-firm gender 
GWGs and the use of innovative human resource practices. According to the standard of 
knowledge, organizational change is mainly driven by technological changes and 
productivity shocks and not for gender equality reasons. We therefore argue that the 
potential bias in our results may be ignored.  
Performance depending pay systems do not involve lower gender wage gaps within firms. 
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the crowding out 
and intrinsic motivation by performance related pay systems is more relevant for women. 
Furthermore, the share of women affected by extensive performance pay schemes is rather 
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small. Finally, performance related bonuses may in practice relate to the base salary. As a 
consequence, the incentive pay system manifests the original pay gap. 
Based on our information about firm age, we find some evidence for the hypothesis that the 
in-plant culture is affected by the increasing awareness of gender inequality in the society. In 
aking and continuously training helps to 
 
all estimation specifications, firms founded after 1990 tend to exhibit lower gender wage 
gaps than older establishments. That is, managers and supervisors are no isolated individuals 
who act detached from their social environment, but are influenced by social norms and 
trends (see e.g. Baron 1984; Acker 1990, 1992).  
We hence conclude that the reorganization of work within German establishments, appearing 
in team work, worker participation in decision-m
limit the arbitrariness with regard to wages. Nonetheless, the use of these practices does not 
guarantee equal treatment of men and women. Especially training programs, if aligned with 
the typical time schedule and employment career of men, involve some risk to manifest the 
traditional gender disparity with respect to wages. But also the implementation of measures 
to foster employee involvement should be guided by a gender mainstreaming concept to 
ensure that both men and women benefit from these expensive organizational changes. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Summary statistic of individual characteristics for the firm-specific wage regressions 
(pooled over 1998-2003) 
Variables Men Women 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Daily wage rate (in log) 4.67 0.25 4.50 0.29 
Low education without vocational 
training 0.11 0.31 0.16 0.37 
Vocational training 0.67 0.47 0.62 0.49 
Secondary school (with and without 
vocational training) 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.33 
College of higher education or university 0.16 0.37 0.10 0.30 
Age (in years) 40.97 9.35 38.44 10.08 
Job tenure (in days/1000) 1.52 1.01 1.27 0.96 
Share of censored wage rates 0.18 0.39 0.06 0.24 
Observations 3796630 1185802 
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 100 male full-time and 20 female full-time employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1998-2003. 
Table A2: Summary statistic of individual characteristics for the pooled wage regression (pooled 
over 1998-2003) 
Variables Men Women 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Daily wage rate (in log) 4.55 0.34 4.33 0.32 
Low education without vocational 
training 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36 
Vocational training 0.65 0.48 0.70 0.46 
Secondary school (with and without 
vocational training) 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.26 
College of higher education or university 0.17 0.37 0.07 0.26 
Age (in years) 41.28 9.68 39.22 10.42 
Job tenure (in days/1000) 1.17 0.96 1.12 0.92 
Share of censored wage rates 0.15 0.35 0.02 0.16 
Observations 187920 214362 
Note: The results refer to firms with 20-99 male full-time and more than 20 female full-time employees.  
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1998-2003. 
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Table A3: Summary statistic of firm characteristics (pooled over 1998-2003)  
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
Variables Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Number of Employees (in 1000) 0.858 1.86 0.773 1.57 0.909 1.94
Share of women 0.417 0.24 0.422 0.24 0.412 0.24
Share of women with fix-term contracts 0.074 0.12 0.073 0.12 0.067 0.11
Working hours (with imputation) 37.541 1.68 37.582 1.65 37.467 1.68
Working hours (without imputation) 37.521 1.71 37.560 1.69 37.467 1.68
State of the art 2.939 0.71 2.936 0.71 2.932 0.71
Investment in information and  
communication technology  0.848 0.36 0.841 0.37 0.812 0.39
Works council 0.907 0.29 0.907 0.29 0.910 0.29
Collective agreement 0.863 0.34 0.862 0.34 0.887 0.32
Average wage rate 4.905 1.62 4.873 1.60 5.001 2.00
Wage rate > collective agreement 0.531 0.50 0.516 0.50 0.539 0.50
Founded after 1990 0.093 0.29 0.091 0.29 0.096 0.29
Organisational change 0.600 0.49 0.601 0.49 0.592 0.49
Incentive pay 0.311 0.46 0.317 0.47 0.328 0.47
Continuous training 0.945 0.23 0.947 0.22 - -
Share of training participants - - 0.278 0.35 - -
Female share of all training participants - - 0.388 0.27 - -
Equal opportunities  - - - - 0.299 0.46
Year   
Year dummy 1998 0 0 0 0 0.442 0.50
Year dummy 1999 0.178 0.38 0.240 0.43 0 0
Year dummy 2000 0.278 0.45 0 0 0 0
Year dummy 2001 0.346 0.48 0.491 0.50 0 0
Year dummy 2002 0 0 0 0 0.558 0.50
Year dummy 2003 0.197 0.40 0.269 0.44 0 0
Instustry sectors   
Agriculture and forestry; electricity, gas and  
water supply, mining 0.021 0.14 0.019 0.14 0.028 0.17
Manufacturing I 0.112 0.32 0.097 0.30 0.144 0.35
Manufacturing II 0.253 0.43 0.230 0.42 0.322 0.47
Construction 0.009 0.09 0.009 0.09 0.011 0.10
Wholesale and retail trade 0.068 0.25 0.065 0.25 0.085 0.28
Transport and communication 0.028 0.16 0.025 0.16 0.030 0.17
Financial intermediation 0.078 0.27 0.070 0.26 0.102 0.30
Real state, renting and business activities  0.042 0.20 0.040 0.20 0.047 0.21
Education 0.025 0.16 0.023 0.15 0.034 0.18
Other service activities  0.169 0.37 0.153 0.36 0.199 0.40
Regions   
Berlin-West 0.059 0.24 0.062 0.24 0.064 0.24
Schleswig Holstein 0.020 0.14 0.019 0.14 0.022 0.15
Hamburg   0.059 0.24 0.053 0.22 0.042 0.20
Niedersachsen 0.106 0.31 0.106 0.31 0.098 0.30
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Table A3: continued       
Bremen   0.026 0.16 0.026 0.16 0.025 0.16
North Rhine-Westphalia 0.232 0.42 0.221 0.41 0.238 0.43
Hesse  0.102 0.30 0.117 0.32 0.119 0.32
Rhineland-Palatinate 0.068 0.25 0.066 0.25 0.067 0.25
Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.147 0.35 0.144 0.35 0.145 0.35
Bavaria   0.156 0.36 0.159 0.37 0.162 0.37
Saarland 0.024 0.15 0.027 0.16 0.019 0.14
Observations  4898   3298  2388   
Note: The results refer to firms with at least 20 male full-time and 20 female full-time employees.   
Source: own calculation; LIAB-Data 1998-2003 
Table A4: Robustness checks 1: Estimation results without imputation of working hours  
  Model 1a Model 2a 
Variables Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value 
Constant -0.0573 -0.96 -0.0691 -1.08 
Employees (in 1000) -0.0111 -6.90 -0.0109 -5.10 
Employees2 (in 1000) 0.0003 4.77 0.0003 3.04 
Share of women 0.0492 4.15 0.0735 4.81 
Share of women with fix-term contracts -0.0134 -1.13 -0.0258 -1.37 
Working hours 0.0069 4.37 0.0071 4.28 
State of the art 0.0027 1.82 0.0040 1.67 
Investment in information and 
communication technology  0.0018 0.74 0.0022 0.50 
Works council -0.0360 -4.63 -0.0434 -4.45 
Collective agreement -0.0052 -1.23 -0.0082 -1.30 
Average wage rate 0.0013 1.49 0.0016 1.14 
Wage rate > collective  
agreement 0.0051 1.79 0.0142 3.03 
Founded after 1990 -0.0092 -1.22 -0.0138 -1.51 
Organisational change -0.0090 -3.21 -0.0081 -2.14 
Incentive pay -0.0011 -0.49 -0.0069 -1.76 
Continuous training -0.0073 -1.55 -0.0069 -0.81 
Share of training participants - - -0.0042 -0.93 
Female share of all training participants - - -0.0155 -1.38 
No. of observations 3,993 2,411 
No. of groups 2,146 1,925 
Wald Test 427.6 416.5 
Roh 0.8830 0.8410 
Note: Model 1a and Model 2a uses only the original information on working hours and is hence not based on 
observations from the year 2003. All models also include control variables for the year, the region and the 
industry sector.  
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Table A5: Robustness checks 2: Estimation results with alternative information on workplace 
practices: without incentive pay 
  Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b 
Variables Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value 
Constant 0.1028 2.24 0.7437 1.49 -0.0789 -1.13 
Employees (in 1000) -0.0104 -7.12 -0.0131 -6.55 -0.0091 -5.30 
Employees2 (in 1000) 0.0002 4.34 0.0003 3.22 0.0002 4.73 
Share of women 0.0200 2.24 0.0374 3.29 0.0464 3.38 
Share of women with  
fix-term contracts -0.0188 -1.73 -0.0212 -1.37 -0.0191 -0.99 
Working hours 0.0021 1.78 0.0029 2.23 0.0078 4.35 
State of the art 0.0019 1.41 0.0033 1.77 0.0037 1.55 
Investment in information and 
communication technology  0.0016 0.71 -0.0002 -0.06 0.0051 1.21 
Works council -0.0276 -4.04 -0.0290 -3.63 -0.0348 -3.75 
Collective agreement -0.0073 -1.88 -0.0141 -2.88 -0.0157 -2.33 
Average wage rate 0.0011 1.53 0.0016 1.60 -0.0024 -2.78 
Wage rate > collective  
agreement 0.0096 3.85 0.0170 5.10 0.0102 2.37 
Founded after 1990 -0.0101 -1.44 -0.0154 -1.85 -0.0206 -3.17 
Organisational change -0.0097 -3.39 -0.0104 -2.88 -0.0074 -1.95 
Continuous training -0.0103 -2.55 -0.0072 -1.17 - - 
Share of training participants - - -0.0057 -1.78 - - 
Female share of all  
training participants 
- - 
-0.0165 -2.21 
- - 
Equal opportunities  - - - - -0.0037 -1.15 
No. of observations 4,982 3,373 2,479 
No. of groups 2,353 2,170 1,959 
Wald Test 323.71 353.24 403.96 
Roh 0.8623 0.8423 0.8435 
Note: Model 1 is estimated with a sample covering the years 1999 to 2001 and 2003. Model 2 is based on 
observations from 1999, 2001 and 2003. Model 3 includes the years 1998 and 2002 only. The number of 
observation is slighlty higher compared to the results presented in Tabel 6 because of missing values of the 
incentive pay variable. All models also include control variables for the year, the region and the industry sector.  
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Table A6: Robustness checks 3: Estimation results with alternative information on workplace 
practices: with an accumulated measure on workplace practices, without incentive pay. 
  Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c 
Variables Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value 
Constant 0.0815 1.60 0.0610 1.12 -0.1055 -1.39
Employees (in 1000) -0.0100 -6.57 -0.0119 -6.53 -0.0093 -4.65
Employees2 (in 1000) 0.0002 4.34 0.0003 3.77 0.0003 3.21
Share of women 0.0189 1.87 0.0345 2.8 0.0442 2.99
Share of women with fix-term 
contracts -0.0162 -1.33 -0.0114 -0.67 -0.0119 -0.59
Working hours 0.0028 2.08 0.0033 2.3 0.0083 4.22
State of the art 0.0007 0.49 0.0024 1.17 0.0036 1.45
Investment in information and 
communication technology  0.0021 0.88 -0.0012 -0.35 0.0056 1.26
Works council -0.0274 -3.54 -0.0286 -3.2 -0.0282 -2.86
Collective agreement -0.0077 -1.81 -0.0141 -2.71 -0.0145 -2.03
Average wage rate 0.0011 1.25 0.0016 1.48 -0.0025 -2.81
Wage rate > collective 
agreement 0.0085 3.17 0.0148 4.15 0.0110 2.44
Founded after 1990 -0.0069 -0.87 -0.0127 -1.33 -0.0167 -2.36
Organisational change -0.0038 -3.74 -0.0044 -3.67 -0.0046 -3.32
Continuous training -0.0128 -2.97 -0.0105 -1.6 - -
Share of training participants - - -0.0048 -1.43 - -
Female share of all training 
participants 
- -
-0.0128 -1.57
- -
Equal opportunities  - - - - -0.0035 -1.06
No. of observations  4,138 2,839 2,207 
No. of groups 1,908 1,772 1,689 
Wald Test 287.82 316.21 353.32 
Roh  0.8670 0.8438 0.8447 
Note: Model 1 is estimated with a sample covering the years 1999 to 2001 and 2003. Model 2 is based on 
observations from 1999, 2001 and 2003. Model 3 includes the years 1998 and 2002 only. All models also 
include control variables for the year, the region and the industry sector. 
